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Under a Certain Little Star
By Wislawa Szymborska
Translated by Joanna Trzeciak
My apologies to chance for calling it necessity.
My apologies to necessity in case I'm mistaken.
Don't be angry, happiness, that I take you for my own.
May the dead forgive me that their memory's but a flicker.
My apologies to time for the quantity of world overlooked per second.
My apologies to an old love for treating a new one as the first.
Forgive me, far-off wars, for carrying my flowers home.
Forgive me, open wounds, for pricking my finger.
My apologies for the minuet record, to those calling out from the abyss.
My apologies to those in train stations for sleeping soundly at five in the morning.
Pardon me, hounded hope, for laughing sometimes.
Pardon me, deserts, for not rushing in with a spoonful of water.
And you, O hawk, the same bird for years in the same cage,
staring, motionless, always at the same spot,
absolve me even if you happen to be stuffed.
My apologies to the tree felled for four table legs.
My apologies to large questions for small answers.
Truth, do not pay me too much attention.
Solemnity, be magnanimous toward me.
Bear with me, O mystery of being, for pulling threads from your veil.
Soul, don't blame me that I've got you so seldom.
My apologies to everything that I can't be everywhere.
My apologies to all for not knowing how to be every man and woman.
I know that as long as I live nothing can excuse me,
since I am my own obstacle.
Do not hold it against me, O speech, that I borrow weighty words,
and then labor to make them light.
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ABSTRACT
For several decades, thousands of refugees have been fleeing into Kenya, and now Kenya
is host to the world‟s largest refugee settlement. The mass influx of refugees and their
protracted situation in Kenya gives evidence that there is a crisis within international
refugee law. Refugees are a group of people that have been given a distinct rights
regime, and their right to freedom of movement has been inhibited due to state practices.
This is proof that the international refugee protection regime is at risk of breaking down.
It is creating an environment in which states are resorting to harmful policies of
containment and restrictions on movement. This is leading to the development of
warehousing refugees which is considered a possible new solution to protracted refugee
situations. This policy of containment is not a solution to the refugee “problem,” and the
reality that it is considered a fourth solution among the three durable solutions raises
concern. Warehousing is a consequence of the shortcomings of the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and subsequent 1967 Protocol which were not
designed to respond to current protracted refugee situations. Regardless of the legality of
warehousing under the refugee rights regime, it is a violation of the human right to
freedom of movement. The lack of application of human rights law to refugees
symbolizes the harmful gap that exists between these two international law regimes.
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I. Introduction
When Abdullahi Salat was forced to the Dadaab camp as a young boy in 1991,
fleeing civil war in his homeland Somalia, little more than shrubs and a few tents dotted
the landscape. A woman working for the United Nations greeted him in what was then a
safe haven and a nearly empty environment. She showed him to his tent and sprinkled
seeds into his palm. “Plant them,” Mr. Salat remembered the aid worker telling him, “It‟s
hot here.” He had told her no that day, since Dadaab was not his home, and he believed
he would be moving on shortly. Now he says, “The trees are very huge.”7
For twenty years, violence and anarchy in Somalia has forced an estimated two
million Somali citizens to flee the country.8 Of these, an estimated half of all Somalis
fleeing to Kenya comprise the world‟s largest refugee settlement. Urban refugees have
also existed within Nairobi, and international aid agencies have long been aware of them.
Today, there are estimated 40,000–100,000 refugees in the city.9 For several decades,
Kenya has been a host to refugees. Now there are over 412,000 refugees living in the
country making it one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in the world. Although the
Kenyan border is officially closed to Somali asylum seekers, there are 6,000-7,000 “new
arrivals” each month.10 Kenya is still in the midst of a rapidly escalating refugee crisis in
both the camps and in the cities because Somalia‟s conflict has yet to be resolved.
This protracted situation in Kenya is just one of many that serves as evidence that
there is a crisis within the refugee regime. There are mass numbers of refugees and this
brings about concern and frustration when trying to deal with the influx. This is proof
that the international refugee protection regime appears to be at risk of breaking down.
Refugees are state-made foreigners. The circumstances in which they find themselves, in
a host country, question their right to freedom of movement and just how free they are to
7

Josh Kron, Somalia‟s Wars Swell a Refugee Camp in Kenya, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/12/world/africa/12dadaab.html.
8
Melissa Fleming, Neighbouring countries feeling the strain as Somalia‟s emergency grows, UNHCR: THE
UN REFUGEE AGENCY, May 3, 2010, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4bde90856.html..
9
Sarah Dix, Urbanisation and the social protection of refugees in Nairobi, 35 HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE
NETWORK, Nov. 2006, available at http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2841.
10
Elizabeth Campbell, Somalis in Kenya: Invest in the Long-Term, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL FIELD
REPORT (Nov. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/somali%20refugees%20in%20kenya.pdf.
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go about their daily lives. This is where human rights law must enter the dynamics; if the
international refugee regime reaches a point where it actually may break down, human
rights law can be there to pick up the pieces. I do not believe that the refugee regime has
already collapsed, but it is under a considerable amount of pressure. This pressure needs
to be countered with support from human rights law.
There are barriers and discrimination imposed by the Kenyan government and the
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in both the Dadaab camps
and in Nairobi. Critique of the refugee regime in regards to the UNHCR‟s role will prove
that human rights law and refugee law should not be treated separately. NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) and observers have reported that problems exist, and the
Kenyan government is taking certain actions to affect or constrain movement of refugees.
Using Kenya as a case study to analyze larger issues, this thesis will explore the more
subtle ways in which governments‟ ambivalence about the presence of refugees expresses
itself in the form of policy towards, and control measures on, refugee populations. It will
highlight state actions that restrict freedom of movement and determine whether
differential treatment towards refugees is indicative of poor application of international
law. State actions of confining refugees to camps will be underscored to prove that
refugee law is outdated.

Despite knowing that refugee law is a specific regime created

for a particular group of people, the new idea that human rights must accommodate
refugee law will be emphasized.
Part I studies Kenya and its domestic as well as international character in the
refugee regime. The background will illustrate the situation in Kenya, as it is home to
one of the world‟s largest refugee settlements. 11 It will elucidate the consequences from
the difficulty of establishing clear movement rights for refugees. These consequences
include state actions of warehousing and detention. Part II explains the right to freedom
of movement and the limitations on movement of refugees through the lens of human
rights. The focus is on the right to freedom of movement and what it entails for refugees
while reminding the international community that human rights law must assist refugee

11

Human Rights Watch: From Horror to Hopelessness: Kenya‟s Forgotten Somali Refugee Crisis 12
(March 2009).
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law.12 This analysis will be a normative assessment of the policies of Kenya to argue that
warehousing and detention of refugees are not solutions to the “refugee problem”13 and
because they are even considered solutions, it is further cause for a push for a human
rights application within the refugee regime. There is a problematic gap that exists
between human rights law and refugee law, and this allows for violations of refugees‟
right to freedom of movement.

While states are arguably trying to cope with mass

influxes of refugees, the lack of human rights application contributes to the ongoing crisis
of refugees‟ restrictions on movement.

12

The word “refugee” will be used if an individual has been recognized under the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees as well as if the individual is considered a de facto refugee. If the case is
de facto, the individual is one of the thousands of those forced to leave their home and thus on the move,
and they have yet to gain official recognition from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Asylum seekers are those looking to obtain refugee status and just have not gone through the
Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process yet to be possibly granted refugee status. Just because they
are not officially recognized as a refugee does not mean that they should be treated differently than those
who are officially recognized. All are people who have been uprooted, and the massive numbers of those
who have been displaced makes it difficult for a speedy process of RSD.
13
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, State-Centered Refugee Law: From Resettlement to Containment, 14 MICH. J.
INT‟L. L. 121 (1992).
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II.

Case Study: Kenya
A. Background of the Issue
Beginning in 1992, several hundred thousand Somali refugees crossed the border

into Kenya‟s Northeast Province as the civil conflict in Southern Somalia intensified.14
Still today, Somali asylum seekers are crossing Kenya‟s officially closed border by the
thousands to escape Somalia‟s violence and to seek shelter within three heavily
overcrowded and chronically under-funded refugee camps near Dadaab in north-east
Kenya.15 Somali refugees remain stuck in a limbo in camps which are now home to over
300,000 refugees, making them the world‟s largest refugee settlement.16 Dadaab is
located about 100 kilometers from the Somali-Kenyan border. The camps were created
in mid-1992 after Kenya realized it was impossible to run the camps in Liboi due to daily
violence in the southern border region. Thus, with security concerns for the international
staff, refugees, and humanitarian supplies, Dadaab camps were created further inside
Kenya‟s borders. Dadaab camps are located in a region that is semi-arid and originally
sparsely populated by nomadic Somali-Kenyans before the arrival of refugees fleeing the
violence in Somalia. The massive number of refugees fleeing across the Kenyan border
when war in Somalia broke out overwhelmed the local nomadic population as well as the
natural resources which were scarce in the area. International organizations brought the
previously marginalized region attention with provision of services such as boreholes,
hospitals, and schools. By March of 2003, 160,000 of over 400,000 Somali refugees who
fled the war remained in Kenya. Of these, 130,000 were in Dadaab; the remaining lived
in other camps while some moved to urban areas such as Nairobi. 17

14

Jennifer Hyndman & Bo Viktor Nylund, UNHCR and the Status of Prima Facie Refugees in Kenya, 10
INT‟L J. REFUGEE L. 23 (1998).
15
Human Rights Watch, supra note 5, at 1.
16
There are three camps which surround Dadaab. They are Dagahaley (population 77,036), Hagadera
(91,982), and Ifo (86,732), accoding to UNHCR statistics on file with Human Rights Watch. The camps
are located within an 18 kilometer radius of Dadaab, cover 50 kilometers, and each are separated by
significant distances, as described in Human Rights Watch, supra note 5.
17
Awa M. Abdi, In Limbo: Dependency, Insecurity, and Identity amongst Somali Refugees in Dadaab
Camps, 22 REFUGE 6 (Winter 2005).
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The entry of thousands into what is an already severely overcrowded and underresourced camp has exacerbated the shortages of shelter, water, food, and healthcare for
all refugees. The number of refugees who have directly traveled to Nairobi is unknown.
They have been described as having „disappeared‟ into the city and do not receive any
support; they remain invisible to the world.18 They may arguably have the right to
freedom of movement since they can travel throughout the cities, yet Kenya does not
consider them for refugee protection unless they stay within the confinements of the
refugee camps.
Somalis, and other groups of refugees in Kenya,19 face a complicated problem –
they are leaving a situation where security has been destabilized; meanwhile, they find
themselves living along Kenya‟s borders and within its capital where they face many
problems. One of the official positions of the Kenyan Government (which is widely
supported by the local population), is that urban refugees are an economic burden on the
city.20 Some refugees remain forgotten in camps where they cannot go back home
because of threats of persecution. Some move to cities like Nairobi, and others stay in
camps such as Dadaab and become one of hundreds of thousands waiting for
resettlement. While refugees leave their homeland to escape persecution and death, the
ideal circumstance is that they are leaving a bad situation to arrive in a better one for only
a limited amount of time. However, Somali refugees – both within the camps and in
Nairobi – have remained in Kenya for nearly 20 years. Kenya sees its refugees as a
burden, yet it still provides camps for the refugees and gives those living in the camps
benefits and incentives to remain there and away from the cities.
Kenya‟s refugee policy has “oscillated, in a distinctly Machiavellian sense,
between „hospitality and hostility to refugees and asylum-seekers.‟”21

Unlike its

neighbors Uganda and Tanzania, Kenya had considered itself a transit state. It also
18

Human Rights Watch, supra note 5, at 1.
Although most of the refugees living in the camps are Somali, there are also refugees from Uganda,
Sudan, the Congo and other countries suffering from conflict, as described in CARE, available at
http://www.care.org/careswork/emergencies/dadaab/.
20
Elizabeth H. Campbell, Urban Refugees in Nairobi: Problems of Protection, Mechanisms of Survival,
and Possibilities for Integration, 19 JOURNAL OF REFUGEE STUDIES 396 (2006).
21
Monica Kathina Juma & Astri Suhrke, ERODING LOCAL CAPACITY: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
ACTION IN AFRICA 100 (Nordic Africa Institute, ed.) (June 2003).
19
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furthered the Machiavellian mindset and “wielded a heavy stick” against refugees it
considered a threat to state security.22

The refugees who did not threaten Kenya‟s

security and national interests were treated with ambivalence, and the UNHCR and
NGOs in the state were allowed to manage refugee affairs.23 Kenya‟s ambivalence can
be seen through its encampment policy of confining thousands of refugees in camps
while paying no attention to those who are moving freely in the cities.

B. International Responsibilities
Kenya has international obligations for hosting refugees. Kenya signed the 1951
Convention in 1966 and the 1967 Protocol in 1981.24 The Kenyan government is also a
party to the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.25 The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees grant specific rights to
refugees while they are applying for asylum.

State signatories have an obligation to

grant these rights.
Kenya became a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) without reservations on May 1, 1972.26 By belonging to the ICCPR,
Kenya has international legal obligations to allow for freedom of movement within its
borders.27 Article 12(1) states, “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall,
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence.”28 It also has the obligation to provide the CCPR Human Rights Committee
with any relevant domestic legal rules and administrative and judicial practices relating to

22

This is included Somali refugees in the 1990s, see id. at 100.
Id.
24
Hyndman, supra note 8, at 29.
25
Kenya ratified the OAU Convention in 1992, as described in Hyndman, supra note 8, at 29.
26
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entry into force March 23,
1976. U.N.T.S.
27
See Article 12 (4), General Comments: “Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State enjoys, within
that territory, the right to move freely and to choose his or her place of residence. In principle, citizens of a
State are always lawfully within the territory of a that State,” as described by Human Rights Committee,
General Comment 27, Freedom of movement (Art. 12), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999).
28
International supra note 20, at art. 12(1).
23

6

the rights protected by Article 12.29 This is required to prevent officials from taking
“arbitrary and abusively discretionary decisions” as well as to ensure that those whose
right to free movement is restricted understand what their rights are. 30

Further

international law obligations of Kenya require it to guarantee refugees within its borders
the right to choose their own residence and move freely throughout Kenya.31 In reality,
however, this is not the case.

C. Unclear Rights
Currently, the rights of refugees to move freely within Kenya and to reside in
urban areas are not clear. The Kenyan government did pass a Refugee Act in 2006 that
“[set] out the legal and institutional framework for managing refugee affairs.”32
Although Kenya has shown lack of support towards its refugees (by allowing both
discrimination and police brutality towards the refugees to continue), it has made efforts
to provide for them. Refugees do make a contribution to the local and national Kenyan
economy through informal employment and businesses.33 However, the legal system that
Kenya established for refugees still does not afford them their human rights, especially if
they are in the cities.
The Refugee Act set out legal framework governing refugees and established the
institutions and procedures to implement it. In practice, however, there is inadequate
capacity and effort to ensure its effective implementation. Also, there is no national
refugee or asylum policy that assists the Refugee Act, and there is “some confusion about
the government‟s official position.”34 Kenya and the UNHCR, in practice, have used

29

Human Rights Committee, supra note 21.
Human Rights Watch: Welcome to Kenya: Police Abuse of Somali Refugees 80 (June 2010).
31
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, art. 26 states:
“Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of
residence and to move freely within its territory subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in
the same circumstances.”
32
The Act has been described as “largely unwelcomed by civil society” yet “represent[ing] a step in the
right direction,” as described in Sara Pavanello, Samir Elhawary & Sara Pantuliano, Hidden and exponed:
Urban refugees in Nairobi, Kenya, HPG Working Paper, 8 (March 2010).
33
. Id.
34
The confusion can be seen through various disincentives that the Kenyan government instills on the
refugees to leave the camps while at the same time refusing to provide additional land for the continuous
influx of refugees from Somalia, id. at 15.
30
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various disincentives to limit the number of refugees choosing to move outside of camps
while continuing to allow refugees to cross its borders. 35 Part of this can be attributed to
Kenya‟s different asylum policies and its changing attitude towards the refugees.

D. Shifting Asylum Policies
Between the years of 1989 and 2007, Kenya‟s asylum policy went through two
apparent phases. The first phase was “abdication‟ and containment” from 1989-2002,
and the second phase, described as the “age of „interventionism” began in 2002. 36 Both
of these phases were reflections of the political dynamics in Kenya during Daniel Moi‟s
authoritarian regime and current President Mwai Kibaki‟s administration.

The two

administrations have been described as viewing Somali refugees “through a distinct
security prism, with the dictates of state security eclipsing their humanitarian
obligations.”37

The abdicationist policy which Kenya adopted gave the UNHCR

overarching power when addressing the refugees and influence concerning deals with the
local population.

Neither the central government nor the local administration was

consulted when the UNHCR began brokering land deals. Kenya was not able to offer
proper and much-needed security surrounding the camps.

Therefore, the UNHCR

assumed responsibility and subsidized local security personnel and set up police stations
in Dadaab.38 The overall consequence of Kenya‟s abdicationist policy was that the
camps began to provide a “dangerous refuge” for Somali refugees who had escaped their
war-torn homeland.39
Refugees in both the Dadaab and Kakuma camps face restrictions on their
freedom of movement as well as their access to local labor markets. Since there appears
to be no solution to the refugees‟ situations at home, high numbers have begun to selfsettle in Nairobi. However, this is considered illegal under host states‟ laws, and they are

35

Hyndman, supra note 8, at 3.
Gil Loescer, James Milner, Edward Newman & Gary Troeller, PROTRACTED REFUGEES SITUATIONS:
POLITICAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 219 (United Nations University Press) (2008).
37
Id.
38
Monica Kathina Juma & Astri Suhrke, ERODING LOCAL CAPACITY: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
ACTION IN AFRICA 105 (ed., 2002).
39
Id. at 106.
36
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seen as voluntarily giving up their provision of aid. Therefore, what is seen as possibly
greater socio-economic independence comes at the price of loss of protection by the
international community.40

There have been attempts at discussing the possible

advantages of integration into local communities as a solution to the uncertain situation
of refugees in protracted or warehoused situations. However, host countries in the subSaharan region such as Kenya are usually disinclined to take up this discussion, let alone
take initiative to make it happen.41

E. Urban Refugees
Theoretically, urban refugees in Kenya do not exist.

There is no national

legislation that addresses urban refugees, so they are sometimes subjected to the 1967
Immigration Act and the 1973 Aliens Restriction Act of Kenya.42 They are not registered
since they are not in the camps, and they face continuous threats and public statements
concerning their “illegal” status. One of the official positions of Kenya‟s government is
that urban refugees are an economic burden on the city. The economic burden blame,
and the position that urban refugees should be forbidden from living and working in
urban areas, are views which are supported by the local population.43
Before the early 1990s, Kenya had been hosting refugees for decades. 44 By 1988,
there were approximately 12,000 refugees living in Kenya, and these refugees enjoyed
full status rights. They also had the freedom to move throughout Kenya, as well as to
apply for legal local integration. When the conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, and especially
Somalia had caused such vast numbers of refugees to enter Kenya, the Kenyan
Government became overwhelmed. Consequently, Kenyan authorities withdrew from
refugee affairs although it was still a signatory under international refugee law. The pre1991 refugee regime in Kenya was described as “generous and hospitable, with emphasis

40

Katy Long and Jeff Crisp, Migration, mobility and solutions: an evolving perspective, FORCED
MIGRATION REVIEW 56 (July 2010).
41
Tania Kaiser, Participating in Development? Refugee protection, politics and developmental approaches
to refugee management in Uganda, 26 THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 353 (2005).
42
Campbell, supra note 14, at 400.
43
Id. at 396.
44
Id. at 399.
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on local integration,” while the “post-1991 regime has been less hospitable, characterized
by growing levels of xenophobia and few opportunities for local integration.”45 Kenya‟s
ad hoc policies used to address refugee issues, as the numbers of refugees crossing into
Kenya are still increasing, has resulted in reluctance to accept the new refugees.
However, with no other choice, the refugees are required to live in the camps rather than
roam around urban centers. Despite this, there are several thousand refugees who are
living permanently in Nairobi.46 They do run their own small businesses and engage in
small local trade. Since they are living independently in the cities, they do not have
assistance from the UNHCR. They are consistently the victims of police abuse and
arrest. They cannot work legally and therefore they do not have formal positions in the
Kenyan economy. This reinforces the economic burden image. Nairobi‟s refugees are
the ones who are in “legal limbo” because Kenya no longer recognizes their rights as
refugees. Since they are outside of the camps, they do not qualify for any assistance or
aid from Kenya or the UNHCR. It is still common, however, to find refugees searching
for protection by going to the UNHCR Nairobi Branch Office as well as the Ministry of
Home Affair‟s Refugee Secretariat office. Most of Kenya‟s focus has been towards those
living in the camps so there is no defined urban refugee policy or definition as to what
constitutes an urban refugee within Kenya. 47 Urban refugees have freedom of movement
because of Kenya‟s lack of concern for its urban refugees – not because of the refugees
receiving any sort of services or benefits from Kenya. It is Kenya‟s indifference to its
urban refugees that gives them a false sense of freedom of movement.
Although Kenya does not officially allow urban refugees to live within the cities,
it cannot do much to stop them from leaving the camps. As long as the refugees have
money for transportation, money to bribe police, and the ability to make it past all

45

Id.
Most of the refugees living in Nairobi are Somali. There are also Ethiopians, Ugandans, and a small
percentage of Sudanese, as described in id.
47
Campbell, supra note 14, at 400.
46
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checkpoints, they can find themselves in Nairobi where they “slip” into their appropriate
communities.48
Kenya‟s urban refugees must avoid the Nairobi police if they do not have proper
documentation or enough money for bribes.49 Despite their illegality in the cities, it
better serves the interest of the Kenyan government to not have the refugees removed.
They do integrate into society, but the confusion regarding their legality (whether
intentional or not) allows them to be the ones to blame when something goes wrong
socially or economically. This in turn further fuels the xenophobic attitudes that are
dominant in the cities.50 Even as these refugees are allowed to move freely throughout
the city, they still suffer considerably from Kenya‟s ambivalence towards the overall
population of refugees.

F. The Dadaab Camps: An Example of Dangerous Management:
In 1992, Kenya opened the Dadaab camps, in north-eastern Kenya, eighty
kilometers from the border with Somalia. The camps were designed mainly to reduce the
real or perceived threat that refugees in a host country posed to national security. This
policy of containment rested on renouncing responsibility to humanitarian agencies
(specifically the UNHCR) and pushing refugees to the margins of society.51 As a result,
the refugees would be removed from economic activities and not blatantly discriminated
against in public society. Refugees would only be able to qualify for assistance if they
were living in the camps and not living in urban areas such as Nairobi. Anyone found
outside the camps was considered an illegal alien and the threat of deportation was a
reality. The security concern of Kenya and the blame of refugees as a burden to the host
state provided an excuse for the detrimental treatment towards the refugees.

48

The majority of Nairobi‟s urban refugees live in a suburb called Eastleigh. Mostly Somalis live in
Eastleigh. It is low-income but the informal economy is doing very well. The economic success has
brought competition to the area which has pushed out other businesses, as described in id. at 402.
49
Id.at 401.
50
In Elizabeth Campbell‟s 2004 survey, 48 out of 50 non-Somali Kenyans who were residing in Eastleigh
believed that the urban refugees should either live in the camps or go home, as described in id.
51
Loescer, supra note 30, at 221.
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Further, by settling refugees in the Dadaab camps, Kenya hoped that the hardships
endured by the refugees there would push them to “drift away to their homes.”52 Peter
Mwangi Kagwanja, the Southern Africa Project Director for International Crisis Group,
believes that Kenya may have planned to take advantage of the massive flow of relief aid
to ensure that the local Kenyan population would benefit from the predicted spill-over
effects, of both resources and infrastructure, which were originally intended for the
refugees living in the camps. Kagwanja saw the refugee aid as a vital part of the politics
in the region.53 As the numbers of refugees increased, tensions towards the refugees
increased, as well.
The massive influx of refugees beginning in the early 1990s caused hostility to
arise out of the state. Kenya accused refugees of smuggling in firearms and escalating
crime and insecurity within its borders. Refugees were seen widely as an economic,
social, and environmental liability and burden. Most of the refugees that had crossed into
Kenya were poor and did not have useful skills to offer. In December of 1992, President
Moi made a threat to send Somali refugees back by force. A month later, Moi asked the
UNHCR to repatriate all of the refugees residing in Kenya – Somali, Ethiopian and
Sudanese. President Moi stated that refugees “seriously compromised the security of
[Kenya] [and] greatly outstretched the infrastructure and medical services.” 54 In the
beginning, refugees were seen as a vital source for aid, but then they were turned away
because Kenya did not want them on its soil. Nothing, however, could stop the massive
flows of refugees back into Kenya.
In November 2010, nearly 10,000 Somalis fled intense fighting in western
Somalia and entered Kenya seeking refuge. Upon entering Kenya, the Somalis were
forced back into Somalia by Kenya‟s administrative police even though they had
registered with the UNHCR. By turning away a high number of refugees under such
extreme conditions, it shows that the Kenyan government is even now facing extreme
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exasperation and desperation.55 Still, Kenya is host to nearly 340,000 refugees from
Ethiopia, Somalia and Southern Sudan. Despite the UNHCR‟s appeals to allow for these
refugees‟ freedom of movement, they are still, to this day, confined to the camps. 56

G. Refugee Camps: A Legal Anomaly
Refugees and their camps are seen as the “essence of aid; they are a visible sign of
comprehensible and concentrated human need for charity.”57 Answering this call for
comprehensible charity is adhering to international obligations and taking action to
provide security for the refugees. Since the 1950s, when the international protection
system was created, “[physical] threats have grown worse as sprawling refugee camps
near conflict zones have become a lynchpin of the refugee protection system.”58 In
addition, with political and security priorities challenges, the UNHCR is also forced to
make choices regarding camps locations and protection.59 The UNHCR has said that it
would “prefer to „redirect its efforts to ensure wider freedom of movement‟ for Somali
refugees „rather than be perceived as condoning encampment.”60 Further efforts have yet
to be taken.
Refugee camps and repatriation are the “twin pillars” of the strategy of
containment.61 Refugee camps are a legal “anomaly”62 in regards to the right to freedom
of movement. Camps are located directly within the borders and on the territory of the
host country.

The host country, in an effort to be cleared of its international

responsibility, will hand it over to the international organizations that are also present on
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the territory (including the UNHCR).

The consequences of this withdrawing of

responsibility are seen through both state actions of, and the UNHCR‟s complicity in
states confining refugees to camps.
According to the Kenyan Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA), protection
services are available and free of charge to those living in confinement. Those seeking
asylum are encouraged and advised to report to either the Dadaab or Kakuma camps to
submit their asylum claims. There is no assistance to refugees living in urban areas; they
are “expected to take care of themselves.”63 The Department claims that there are
humanitarian organizations in Nairobi that would assist urban refugees but they must
contact them for any further help.64
Those with valid documents and who are recognized refugees are protected under
refugee law against forcible return. There are to be no proceedings against a person in
respect to his “unlawful” presence within Kenya if there has been an application
submitted for recognition as a refugee. If a refugee has been arrested by the police and is
facing serious charges, the only suggestion is to immediately inform the DRA or
UNHCR.65 There are no suggestions on how to do this, and it can be assumed that
issuing any complaint while being detained would be quite difficult.
The Kenyan DRA stated that those who decide to live outside the camps would
not receive medical benefits. However, reasons for obtaining a certain movement pass to
leave the camps include medical consideration. The validity of the pass is stated on the
card, and the holder of the card must return to the designated area before the expiration or
risk prosecution.66 Still, there is no true freedom of movement when holding a movement
pass. Subtle management such as this affects the lives of refugees yet it is not enough to
be seen as a breach of international law.
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The lack of care and measures for those living in the cities begs the question:
when does refugee law begin to apply? Those who live in the cities have freedom of
movement but they do not have proper consideration and protection from the state.

H. Nationals vs. Non-Nationals
The state controls refugees differently than it does with its general population.
First, a state does not need to know where its nationals are all of the time. For nonnationals this is quite different. Kenya, for example, uses its encampment policy to be
sure of the whereabouts of over 300,000 asylum seekers.67 Kenya does not, however,
have concern for refugees who find their way to urban settings because once the refugees
are there, they are on their own. The only way to receive protection and assistance from
both the state and the UNHCR is to be in the camps. This causes problems for refugees
who do not wish to live in a life of encampment. Human rights can prove itself worthy in
this situation as systems created to implement the 1951 Convention have not been suffice
to address mass influxes of arrivals. Erika Feller, the Assistant High Commissioner for
Protection, reminds the international community that applying the 1951 Convention in
situations of mass arrivals poses problems. Feller calls for action to be taken to address
the challenge on how to realize solutions for individuals, as well as refugees, that are both
lasting and protection-based.68 Here the human rights regime fits no matter where one
falls under a state‟s jurisdiction, as human rights apply to all.
There is a contradiction between human rights and national sovereignty, and this
has implications for the legitimacy of the state and the rights of nationals and nonnationals. The idealization of human rights is based upon this “metaphysical notion of a
sovereign subject” and it raises the individual‟s concerns over state sovereignty. This
happens at the same that affirming the nation-state also means human rights are protected
and enforced only as nation rights.69 They are not considered universal. Nationalism has
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ascended to change the state from protecting human rights of “all inhabitants in its
territory no matter what their nationality” to a state whose function is to distinguish
between nationals and non-nationals and on this basis to only grant full civil and political
rights to those who are nationals by origin and birth.70

With this transformation,

citizenship rather than human rights became “the precondition for the effective
possession of human rights and coincided with the emphasis on mutually exclusive
citizenries within the nation-state system.”71 Anyone who finds themselves as a nonnational is in-turn a state-made foreigner and when compared to the national, has very
few rights.
Refugees suffer lack of citizenship while seeking refuge within a host country.
The Rights of Man,72 which have been defined as inalienable, are no longer that.
Refugees have no government to back these rights, and they have to fall back on their
minimum rights.

This leaves them with no authority to protect themselves and no

institution willing to instill and guarantee these rights. There is a paradox of human
rights in the instance of refugee rights: “…while the protection of human rights within the
international system is inseparably tied to state sovereignty, states are also authorized to
deprive citizens of those same rights and to exclude individuals from the condition of
nationality that would enable them to have human rights.”73
The reason for there even to be a discussion concerning the relationship between
refugee law and human rights law is because of the “limbo” that refugees are continually
stuck in. It is a limbo because the refugees are “neither assimilated, integrated nor
immediately eliminated.”74

They are forced to leave their homeland while seeking

protection and resettlement in order to continue their lives. Kenya‟s encampment policy
is a visual reminder of the gap between the two regimes, and more specifically, the lack
of freedom of movement and Kenya‟s ambivalence towards its refugees. However, the
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gap can be filled if Kenya fulfills its international, humanitarian and political obligations
that ensure refugees basic human rights, especially the right to freedom of movement.
All of the elements discussed above comprise a discussion of how one reaches
human rights in the refugee world. There is a complex gap which is not only about
human rights – the focus extends further than this. First, human rights law and refugee
law are different. Human rights law, as previously mentioned, can be there to pick up the
pieces, but because of the dichotomy between the two regimes, it is not as easy as that. It
is more complicated because the discussion focuses around a specific group of people
who have their own rights regime because of the circumstances in which they find
themselves. This group of people, who have been forced to move, suffer from a lack of
human rights and more specifically, a lack of the right to freedom of movement. There is
a limitation on movement by states, clearly. So, if there is a limitation on refugee
movements, what does this mean for freedom of movement for refugees? This question,
and the notion that the warehousing is considered a fourth solution, is what lead to the
conclusion that there needs to be a stronger human rights focus within refugee law.
Discussing the freedom of movement of refugees is risky and complicated because
freedom of movement is found in human rights language. Human rights of refugees can
be problematic because these are two different regimes. Without human rights discussion
there is no freedom of movement for refugees.

I. A “Movement” Pass for Refugees
In Kenya, refugees who have been forced out of their home country and have
found themselves in the camps must work their way through a hierarchy of power that
would provide them with a pass. This “movement permit” gives them permission to leave
the camp or settlement but refugees‟ right to freedom of movement is constrained
through administrative and legislative practices.75 Refugees resort to producing fake
passes, and these have been described by both the UNHCR and Kenya‟s DRA as being
difficult to distinguish from valid passes. Thus, Kenyan police often forcibly turn back or
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arrest refugees who are carrying valid movement passes that are valid.

There are

instances in which refugees carrying valid movement passes are arrested or turned back
even when it is known that these passes are valid. According to an official working for
an agency in Dadaab, “Now we don‟t know from one day to the next how restrictive the
policy will be.”76 One instance occurred during February 2010 in which police at the
Modikare check point arrested four refugees traveling to Garissa for medical care.
Although all four of the refugees had valid movement passes, as well as their medical
documents, the officers looked at the four refugees and told them, “You don‟t really look
sick.” Consequently, all were returned to the camps.77
The DRA has taken measures to prevent Kenyan police from turning back or
forcibly returning refugees who are traveling with valid movement passes. However, so
far, it has been described as unsuccessful. The DRA has taken steps to provide police at
checkpoints with daily updates on whom are traveling with valid movement passes from
Dadaab to Garissa and then from there to Nairobi. This attempt to avoid refugees from
being detained or taken to court has been unsuccessful even with the UNHCR‟s help.
The UNHCR claims that it has provided police at the Garissa checkpoint with UNHCR
phone numbers for them to call if they have any doubts but no phone calls have been
made.78
Kenya‟s obligations through international refugee law require it to guarantee
refugees the right to choose their own residence as well as to be able to move freely
throughout Kenya. Kenya is only allowed to limit movement, whether it is of nationals
or non-nationals, if it is “provided by law…and necessary to protect national security,
public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others.”79 Also, the
restrictions must be non-discriminatory and seen as necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.
This also leaves room for open interpretation for Kenya to determine what it sees as a
legitimate aim. A restriction on a refugee‟s freedom of movement in Kenya must be
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proportionate in relation to the aim sought to be achieved by the restriction.80 While
refugees often have a valid movement pass, there is a distinct violation of this privilege
by measures taken to limit their movement.

J. State Fears Lead to Warehousing
Kenya‟s concern for its refugee situation might be expressed through common
state anxieties that refugee protection will lead to permanent immigration. The duty that
comes with admitting refugees within a state‟s border as well as the costs with their
arrival (and often, their protracted stay) are never fairly proportioned among receiving
host countries.81 Even though few governments admit refugee status with permanent
residence, there is little thought or effort by states to “dovetail the modalities of
temporary asylum”82 and create permanent solutions that do not display hostility or
negligence of refugees‟ human rights.
By warehousing the thousands that have sought protection within Kenya‟s
jurisdiction, Kenya has created a permanent solution for its Somali refugees. Recently, in
2004, the U.S. Committee for Refugees in their World Refugee Survey coined the term,
“warehousing” to describe the housing of refugees seeking asylum. The term “shed new
light on old problems and create[d] fresh insight into the reasons for such problems.”83
Kenya has never officially adopted a policy which requires Somali refugees to stay in
camps. Although Kenya does not want refugees within its borders and while it is not
acting aggressive or hostile toward the refugees, it is still not welcoming.
Kenya‟s actions have supported the observation that the asylum process serves
more as a police function than a humanitarian function. This reinforces the “us” from
“them” notion. It also reinforces the Machiavellian idea that sovereign power supersedes
a state‟s concern outside of its borders. The conflict here is that refugee law requires
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states to have a responsibility to protect those who are crossing into its jurisdiction. The
nexus of sovereign power and refugees can be characterized as a powerful system of
global apartheid.
human beings

84

This apartheid establishes a permanent underclass of superfluous

and further enforces the division between human rights law and refugee

law.
1.Warehousing as a Fourth “Solution”
There are three durable solutions to refugee outflows, generally.

They are

voluntary repatriation, local integration into the host society, or resettlement to another
country. A fourth solution has been also seen – warehousing. It has been described as a
forth de facto and “all-too-durable” solution.85 Warehousing is the practice of keeping
refugees in protracted situations with major restrictions on the right to freedom of
movement. There is restricted mobility, enforced idleness, and unwanted dependencies
since their lives have been put on hold and their rights restricted. There are different
standards as to what a protracted situation may be. Some believe it to be more than five
years in exile with no end in sight.86 Regardless, warehousing is focused upon the denial
of the right to freedom of movement although states may see it as a way to handle the
refugee problem and protect national security and local employment. The UNHCR‟s
Global Consultations on International Protection stipulate that, “A protracted refugee
situation is one where, over time, there have been considerable refugees‟ needs, which
neither UNHCR nor the host country have been able to address in a meaningful manner,
thus leaving refugees in a state of material dependency and often without adequate access
to basic rights (e.g. employment, freedom of movement and education) even after many
years spent in the host country.”87 What a state sees as handling its refugee issue is inturn negatively affecting refugees‟ right to freedom of movement.
There are historical and political reasons why host states in Africa increasingly
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rejected local integration of refugees from the 1970s onward in favor of warehousing.88
These reasons include concerns regarding both economic and environmental burdens (in
both poor and richer countries), security concerns, anger at being „abandoned‟ by richer
countries who also have similar international legal obligations for protecting refugees,
fear of the domestic ramifications of xenophobia, and the realist need to reassert
sovereignty over porous borders. Also, host governments benefit from the international
aid associated with encampment, which “would not be forthcoming for self-sufficient,
integrated refugees.”89 The arguments stem from a realist state-centric perspective and
are based on the assumptions that state rights (sovereignty) trump individual rights, and
that citizen rights trump human rights. Based on these assumptions, warehousing is seen
as a legitimate means to prevent perceived threats and gain desired benefits for the state
and for citizens without injuring any significant interests (since refugee interests are not
considered a priori significant).90
While human rights law respects movement generally, it is the legal articulation
that discriminates between the forms of movements. It supports, paradoxically, free
human movement that is disciplined and bounded by state sovereign coercion.91 In his
book, The Global Community,W.M.Spellman explains that “[t]ogether with unpredictable
shifts in climate, natural disasters and threats from hostile neighbours, a life of movement
was the norm for most people and, as a result, fixed notions of territory and resource
appropriation, the „mine and thine‟ were largely absent from the collective assumptions
of the group or kinship community.”92 It also has been a de facto right in every practical
sense because it has been exercised freely by anyone who historically had chosen to
actually exercise it. Within the “annals of international morality, [freedom of movement]
was recognized freely long before the development of modern international law.”93
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Therefore, there is evidence that freedom of movement across national borders is a basic
human right because it has a long and well-known history.
Article 28 of the 1951 Refugee Convention requires signatory states to issue a
travel document to refugees. The travel document represents the „core‟ of the rights of
the refugees and the international refugee regime. The Article stipulates that travel
documents shall be issued to refugees lawfully staying in the host country‟s territory.
States should also be sympathetic to refugees who are unable to attain a travel document
from the country of their lawful residence.94 The article further proves how vital the right
to freedom of movement was regarded after the Second World War when the Convention
was created and the world saw the mass numbers of refugees the War had produced.95
Those being forced to move should have effective means to disengage from detrimental
state policies that have failed to adhere to international human rights law. Failure to
enhance protection of refugees through human rights and ensure their right to freedom of
movement “signals a retrenchment to a paradigm where individual liberties are
subjugated to political expediency.”96
By restricting freedom of movement and enforcing policies of warehousing, this
policy of containment has proven to regard refugees in a category different from
nationals and therefore requiring different rights.

Yet, these refugee rights are not

enforced or practiced, either. Refugees are now often seen as “problem people” as well
as a “collective source of anxiety and potential instability due to their „irregularity.”97
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The response to the influx of refugees within a state‟s borders has consisted of tightening
border control as well as migration policies. It has also consisted of looking towards the
UNHCR for relief. So, instead of focusing on granting refugees asylum and integrating
them into society, the strategy has been to contain them and restrict their rights;98 this is
largely because unlike nationals, refugees are often deemed a threat to state security.
Warehousing refugees prevents them from exercising their basic human rights and
because it is seen as a fourth solution, it supports the growing gap between the two
regimes of international law.
2.Warehousing Effects
Warehousing, a euphemism for restricting refugees‟ right to freedom of
movement, is usually seen in dangerous and isolated areas. Warehousing is rarely done
for humanitarian reasons but to protect the political and economic interests of the state.
Warehousing threatens refugee protection. Human rights cannot be respected in the
camps.99 Refugees do not have freedom of movement and thus suffer in the camps from
“high incidence(es) of violence, exploitation and other criminal activities.”100 Due to
prolonged confinements in the Dadaab camps, Somali refugees become bored, depressed
and resort to chewing khat leaves.101 As the effects from the khat leaves wears off, they
become aggressive against women and girls.102
Warehousing can also bring collective punishment and allow the administrators of
the camps to operate without any sort of checks on power in regards to the treatment to
the confined refugees. For example, in Kakuma in 1994 and 1996, food distribution was
withheld from the entire camp for weeks at a time in order to find the unidentified
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persons who had been vandalizing enclosures that were used for counting the refugees
and distributing rations.103
Warehousing also inhibits voluntary return when refugees are subject to military
leaders in the camps. This is in the host country‟s best interests if it does not wish to
have refugees within its borders. Warehousing refugees can make their disempowerment
even worse as they sit confined all day and “become spectators in their own lives rather
than active participants in decision-making.”104 Freedom of movement and the right to a
travel document are both described as “Anti-Warehousing Rights.”105
Security is still the rising concern and justification for warehousing. Refugees
living in disputed border areas may be a risk, and camps can become “hotbeds of political
agitation.”106 Camps are used for drug smuggling, human trafficking, and gunrunning.
Camps also fall under military or political elements which undermine local law
authorities. An example here is the Sudan People‟s Liberation Army (SPLA) using the
Kakuma camps to recruit people for the rebel forces.107
Refugees are also seen as an economic burden so warehousing solves this issue of
possibly burdening the host country and society. One argument for encampment and
segregated settlement that limits freedom of movement is, “Given the large numbers of
those who need to be integrated, the very low or negative economic growth rates, the
high population growth rates, the drastically declining commodity prices and agricultural
output and the debt crisis, it is imperative that African host governments [keep refugees]
in spatially segregated sites so that the cost of their subsistence would be met by
international refugee support systems…All other talk about integration is wishful
thinking based on inadequate understanding of the economic, social and political realities
of the present day Africa.”108 This argument does not take into consideration the reality
that those who are segregated have their human rights restricted and their daily lives
103
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come to a complete halt. It also ignores the truth that once states segregate communities,
they are often forgotten about and the segregated living becomes a protracted situation.
Because refugees are deprived of their human rights, they are “simultaneously
integrated within the decision-making authority of sovereign power and segregated from
the normalized territory of potential host states.”109 Refugees are integrated within the
decision-making authority when laws and restrictions are considered to keep them
contained and limit their freedom of movement.

This is what causes them to be

segregated from the normalized territory. The recent policies and practices of states,
including warehousing and providing disincentives to leave situations of encampment,
have redefined refugees through an exclusionary process which places them outside the
host community. Typically the host community and society are seen as those holding
human rights when compared to refugees. Since they are not “right-holders” within the
realm of sovereignty, they are instead “superfluous human beings in a state of permanent
limbo.”110 Consequently, Kenya, a state with responsibility for over 300,000 refugees,111
has a reputation with the refugees that is “turning sour.”112 Kenya‟s ambivalence towards
both its containment of refugees in the camps and its apathy towards the refugees in the
cities persists because of the lack of human rights application.
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III. Freedom of Movement: What Does This Right Entail?
Freedom of movement is the „first and most fundamental of man‟s liberties.”113 It
is basic among the element constituting liberty and what it means to have it. The
freedom to leave one‟s own country to go to another enables those wishing to escape
corrupt or abusive political systems that deny them their other rights and freedoms. This
allows for freedom of movement to be seen as a right of “last resort” 114 and proves that
freedom of movement is a foundational and basic human right.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) establishes the right to
freedom of movement. Article 13 states, “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence with the borders of each state; and (2) [e]veryone has the right
to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”115 The ICCPR also
states that everyone has the right to freedom of movement.116 Article 14 of the UDHR
recognizes that all persons have the right to movement as a means for protection. This is
in order to protect their civil and political rights.117
The ability to access a foreign country or territory is considered a necessary
component of the right to freedom of movement because it allows individuals to have the
alternative of participating in social processes of another state. The importance of this is
that it allows for development of freedom and appreciation of life. The right to free
movement is so fundamental that the realization of human aspirations and development
depend upon it.118 The UDHR‟s statement on freedom of movement is not completely
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supported because the right to leave a country cannot be fully exercised unless there is a
corresponding right to enter another country. The right to freedom of movement is not
fully accepted. The continuous need by states to protect themselves from an influx of
other people who are not like the host community or may be deemed a threat to national
security or to the state economy119 leaves the right to freedom of movement to be
neglected. Further, Article 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights
stresses the importance of the right to freedom of movement as well as the right to seek
asylum. In addition, the right to leave and return to one‟s own country is also given
importance.120
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination protects the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of a state. The Convention also states that it “shall not apply to distinctions,
exclusions, restrictions, or preferences made by a state party to this Convention between
citizens and non-citizens.”121

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) establishes the “equality of men and women
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural,
civil or any other field.”122 It does not contain any right to freedom of movement, nor
does the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment. It prevents non-refoulement123 but it does not affirm the right to freedom
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of movement.124 These all include adults but children are not forgotten, either, as they
also make up a large portion of the refugee population.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child states that, “States Parties shall take
appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking refugee status or who is
considered in accordance with applicable international or domestic law and procedures
shall…receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of
applicable rights set forth in the present Convention.”125 Although Article 10 allows for a
child to enter or leave a country for purposes of family reunification, 126 there is still no
freedom of movement allowed and this process of reunification is left in the hands of the
state. The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of their Families recognizes that “[m]igrant workers and members
of their families shall be free to leave any state, including their State of origin” and they
also shall have the “right at any time to enter and remain in their State of origin.” 127
Note that this does not include freedom of movement or a right to enter into any state.
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action from the UN World
Conference on Human Rights “stresses the importance of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol
and the regional instruments” so that there is reaffirmation that “everyone, without
distinction of any kind, is entitled to the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution, as well as the right to return to one‟s own country.” 128 There
are no further rights from this. The right to secure asylum is left out, as well, as this is
considered “exactly the situation that pertained nearly half a century ago when the UDHR
was proclaimed.”129
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Article 5 of the General Assembly‟s Declaration on the Human Rights of
Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live states, aliens
lawfully in a territory of a State shall enjoy the right to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose their own residence within the border of the State.130
Freedom of movement may be considered one of the more tolerant practices
which many cultures have in common when there is peace and progress in a society.
Immigrants, however, are voluntary migrants and for them, freedom of movement is only
half a right. This is because the state has a right to pass laws to exclude them and it does
not privilege an individual‟s right over the state.

131

Unfortunately, this very issue has

been seen in the refugee regime, as well. Refugees are excluded from national laws and
not afforded the right to freedom of movement that nationals enjoy. The comparison
between nationals and non nationals will be discussed later.
The right to return also relates to the freedom of movement. The right return to
one‟s own country protects against government repression. It forbids the state from
exiling or forcibly returning those who are seen as a burden or threat. The right to return
also strengthens the right to leave a country in the case of non-nationals. If a nonnational wants to return, it would typically mean that they have a safe place to go back.132
Further, the obligation for states to respect the right to return to one‟s own country is
much stricter. The ICCPR specifically states that individuals should be not be arbitrarily
deprived of this right, and the U.N. Human Rights Committee concludes that there “are
few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one‟s own country
could be reasonable.”133 The Convention on the Rights of the Child allows for no
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restrictions on the right to return. This is for the purpose of reuniting families.134 There
are different aspects to freedom of movement of refugees that go beyond detention.
Freedom of movement is required everywhere, both within the refugee regime as well as
the human rights regime.

A. Necessities
The right to freedom of movement is an individual right which has to be faced
with a state-based international community whose concern is regarding human
migration135 as well as sovereignty. A right to leave it does not automatically mean a
right to enter another state. This is a problem of any type of migration.
Article 26 of the Refugee Convention states that, “Each Contracting State shall
accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence and
to move freely within its territory subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally
in the same circumstances.”136

Government and UNHCR officials often claim that

refugees‟ freedom of movement is actually not inhibited. However, there are obstacles
and gaps in the law that make it difficult, if not impossible, for refugees to exercise their
right to freedom of movement.
An important issue concerning host countries and their treatment towards refugees
in regards to freedom of movement is the common (yet not obvious) action of keeping
refugees near the border of their country of origin.137 States may argue that refugees are
only in transit and that they will soon be leaving, either back to their homeland or
resettled to another country. Therefore, the practice is to keep them near the border and
away from the host country‟s society. However, an article in the 1969 Convention states:
“For reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle refugees at a
reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin.”138 The description
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“reasonable” in regards to distance from the border leaves the interpretation open to
states. This policy that is used by state discretion has led to many attacks on refugees
who have not been able to move beyond their designated living areas. In Africa, “it is the
rule rather than the exception that refugees are settled close to the borders.”139 The rule
here which contradicts the international obligation is justified by the hope of temporary
protection. States hope that they will only be providing temporary security and shelter.
Then the fighting will cease in the refugees‟ homeland and they will return. This denial
causes refugees harm and the continual suppression of their freedom of movement causes
further harm and violations of international law.
The limitation on freedom of movement is done, whether blatantly or more
discreetly, in order to prevent refugees from integrating into mainstream society. Also,
camps and settlements provide the state with means to oversee the refugee population and
know of their whereabouts at all times. Refugees are accepted as temporary guests until
the reasons that have created their displacement are eliminated.140

B. Push for Human Rights Law
Solutions to refugee problems depend on international solidarity and burdensharing, together with parallel developments in those institutions competent to examine
root causes and measures to avert flows.

Detention, however, involves for the

international community and UNHCR both a basic human rights issue and a basic
protection issue.141 Next to life itself, freedom of movement is among the most precious
of human rights.142 Detention plays a main role when state governments wish to prevent
and suppress crime.

Circumstances of flight may generate criminal liability where

refugees enter a receiving country illegally or without proper documentation.

The

majority of refugees, however, are not guilty of serious crimes. In assessing the current
situation in Kenya, or any host country which keeps it refugees in containment, critical
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attention must be paid to the state practice towards refugees in regards to rights under
both refugee law as well as international human rights law.143
If refugees are subject to the same laws as nationals in the negative connotation,
then they must be regarded as such in the light of international human rights law.
Refugees who are often subject to the same law as nationals are exposed to punishment
or detention on account of illegal entry or any entry or movement without valid
documents. Detention is also ordered when the refugee is seen as a public or national
threat to security. This happens to nationals, as well. It is no different, except that with
refugees, the detention is often joined with any immigration violations or offences. 144
Distinguishing between nationals and non-nationals allows for a global apartheid
to exist, and this lets the nation-state remain at the core of all decision-making. It
remains the political and administrative unit,145 even though there are international laws
that state other responsibilities. The idea of „inclusion‟ and that those who are included
are tied to the national identity is an issue that perhaps international law cannot solve.
This can result from the globalized world where “whole classes of people – including
refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrant workers – become de facto if not de jure stateless
persons as the mutating borders of exclusion continually deprive individuals and
communities of the ability to effectively exercise their civil, political, social, and
economic rights.”146 This ensures that stateless persons are continually in limbo. They
are caught between the conditions they fled and the conditions they find themselves in
while in the host country. They are often not integrated but the state‟s ambivalence has
kept them on the territory, often isolated.147 Refugees in protracted situations must be
included here.

The containment and segregation policies as practices of a global

apartheid call for recognition of such principles as the right to freedom of movement.
The “limitations of freedom of movement has…been the precondition for enslavement,”
and the right to have rights cannot be properly guaranteed and exercised without a
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corresponding guarantee of freedom of movement.148 Without the right to freedom of
movement, there is no possibility for refugees to obtain other rights. While living in
protracted situations, under warehousing policies, the one who is making the decision on
the refugees‟ living conditions and movement limitations essentially possesses the
refugees‟ civil rights. This enforces that the sovereign power requires a condition of
inequality for it to function – limits must be placed upon the right to freedom of
movement and there must be some type of exclusion149 for a sovereign state to assert its
supremacy and authority over its territory and the people living on it.

C. Differences between Human Rights and Refugee Law
In comparison to the system of international human rights protection, the
international refugee regime “can be considered as having greater potential to ensure
compliance with international refugee protection standards.”150 In support of this, the
UNHCR can play an effective supervisory and de facto enforcement role in the
application of international refugee law and related human rights standards. However,
the systems of both refugee and human rights protection differ in significant ways. 151 In
regards to limitations of the refugee regime, there is no formal mechanism, like there is
for human rights protection, for receiving individual or inter-state complaints or petitions.
Secondly, the UNHCR has not given full effect to Article 35 of the 1951 Convention
which is a Contracting State‟s duty to provide the UNHCR with information regarding
implementation of the Convention.152 There is also no system of country practices that
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can be used to formulate observations and recommendations for states and therefore help
ensure compliance with international refugee protection standards. The extent of the
UNHCR‟s involvement in protection and human rights issues concerning refugees
depends upon state‟s allowance of the UNHCR to exercise its mandate in a particular
country as well as provide the UNHCR with available and appropriate resources for the
operation.153 As a consequence, there is a considerable obstacle and hindering in the
UNHCR delivering its protection mandate. With limited human and financial resources,
there is limited effort the UNHCR may be able to produce. This is also a perfect
opportunity for Contracting States to step up to their responsibilities and duties under
international law and ensure that human rights are applied to those living within their
borders. They already have the help of the UNHCR there, so it is time that States took
advantage of that. Otherwise, there is no point in having mass numbers of refugees on
their soil as well as the UNHCR and then not ensuring that human rights are afforded.
The first requirement of actual human rights governance is recognizing that
refugees in the camps are covered by human rights law. Ralph Wilde, a member of the
International Committee on Human Rights Law, asks the question, “[D]oes international
human rights law apply to individuals who claim asylum but who have not had their
status determined by the host state, or does their “temporary” status obviate this?”154
Regardless of the label that someone who has been moved carries, human rights law does
apply. Most of the refugees in the camps meet the criteria for refugee status regardless of
the determination by the host state. In Kenya it is difficult to fathom granting official
refugee status to over 300,000 asylum seekers. However, the individuals should be
entitled to all the rights that are afforded to refugees since “determination is declaratory,
not constitutive, of refugee status.”155
Erika Feller argues that the gaps in refugee protection do not derive, by and large,
from the legal framework. It is abound with principles and guidelines. There is a gap,
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and the gap lies in implementation, with access to asylum, or its provision on adequate
terms which are not fully guaranteed or reliable.156 However, there is no recognition of
freedom of movement in practice so refugees are “swiftly losing ground” in terms of
legal protection provided by states. Many states have pledged their responsibility to
international refugee law yet have also undertaken radical changes through their domestic
legislation and inter-state arrangements.

This results in restrictions to asylum and

provision of legal rights, of human rights, to refugees. The practice of states that limits
refugees‟ freedom of movement is the policy of encampment, or warehousing, or
administrative detention. Whatever it is called, it is a violation of refugee law and in
turn, a violation of human rights law. This “regressive”157 approach is seen in many
traditional asylum countries that claim to be overburdened with refugees. It cannot be
denied that there is a gap in the international protection regime; the arrival of such a vast
number of asylum seekers crossing sovereign states‟ borders as well as the potential
abuse of the asylum process and procedures have resulted in a large burden on some
states. As a Refugee Law Training Officer in Stockholm, Brian Gorlick, states, “[I]t
should be recalled that the system of international refugee protection could not have
foreseen these unprecedented and wide-ranging developments to avoid state
responsibility.”158 Because of this, Gorlick asserts, a gap exists.
Alice Edwards focuses on conceptualizing the relationship between refugee law
and human rights law. The regimes form part of the same legal schema. Tradition and
isolation of refugee law from human rights norms as well as the institutions means that
refugees have lived without recourse to rights which are they are entitled to as not only
refugees but as human beings.
Gorlick reminds us that although there is a majority focus by states to enhance
immigration control mechanisms, and these difficulties of reconciling such control
objectives with obligations are founded in refugee law, there ought to be a similarly-
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major focus on another body of international law – international human rights law. The
High Commissioner for Refugees, in her address to the 54th session of the Commission
on Human Rights, stated that there is an “impressive array of international, regional, and
national human rights standards and structures which must continue to evolve to ensure
that gaps and weaknesses are identified.”159 So, the gaps and weaknesses are those in the
body of international law which begins with implementation of refugee law.
Human Security Now is a Commission on Human Security which has studied
“People on the Move” generally. To the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol‟s credit, a
report of Human Security Now states that these make up the “most developed normative
framework…for refugees.”160 However, it is the application that is lacking, and there is a
gap which persists because of the missing application of human rights law with refugee
law. One of the main focuses, right to freedom of movement, affects both those who
move voluntarily as well as those who are forced to leave and depend upon the host
country for protection and enforcement of rights.
In 1995, the UNHCR Executive Committee called upon the Office “to strengthen
its activities in support of national, legal and judicial capacity building, where necessary,
in cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.”161 One argument is
not only should the UNHCR support developing justice systems in post-conflict
situations, but the Office should also work toward making judicial authorities and the
legal community aware of human rights problems facing refugees and other persons of
concern.

By building awareness and expertise amongst legal and administrative

institutions and other actors, he says, there can be a positive impact on developing
favorable administrative practices and in some instances policies and jurisprudence.
Therefore, the strength of UNHCR‟s field presence should not be underestimated “in
respect of its overall potential to build upon the system of international refugee and more
broadly human rights protection.”162 States must not solely depend upon the UNHCR but
instead support its purpose and advocacy towards ensuring that refugees are afforded
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their rights as both refugees and human beings.

D. The Inter-Relationship between Human Rights and Refugee Law
Without human rights, there would be no basis for refugee rights, as “[t]oday‟s
human rights abuses are tomorrow‟s refugee movements.”163 Human rights abuses are
the core of population displacement, yet there is little research done that tests the
relationship between human rights abuses and the movement of people seeking protection
outside their country of origin.164 There are inherent human rights that accompany a
refugee wherever he or she goes, regardless of whether a border has been crossed or
nearly approached upon. Since a host country must respect the human rights of anyone
under its jurisdiction and on its territory, the human rights of refugees are part of the
larger human rights protection regime.165 The relationship between the violation of
human rights and refugee movements is causal.166 The Executive Committee of the
UNHCR, in its 1988 Conclusion No. 52 (XXXIX) on “International Solidarity and
Refugee Protection,” stated that it had a “deep concern over the serious violations of
human rights which accompany refugee problems and the dislocation and distress they
cause for millions of individuals involved.”167 The concern is justified as refugee law is
affected by states‟ ambivalence towards its refugees as well as its desire to maintain
sovereignty.
Alice Edwards believes that asylum policies and practices by governments
question the scope of the 1951 Convention.

She sees western governments

“implementing hard-line or restrictive asylum policies and practices in order to deter and
to prevent asylum-seekers from seeking refuge on their territory, including by
interception and interdiction measures, visa controls, carrier sanctions, „safe third
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country‟ arrangements, administrative detention, and/or restrictive interpretations of the
refugee definition.”168 These restrictions on freedom of movement are due to states‟
ability to keep international refugee law distinct from human rights law and “flout
minimum standards.”169 It is custom for the UNHCR to view refugee law as part of the
(what should be) broader international human rights framework, yet it does not always
stress its obligatory nature and instead offers suggestions and guidance for States‟
standards domestically-speaking.170 This allows for states to take advantage of the gap
between the two international law regimes. However, as Edwards states, understanding
the inter-relationship is crucial in order to be able to identify the obligations of countries
of asylum. To Edwards, this is a starting point of any sort of determination of the
standards of treatment for refugees (even though it is still often neglected). It is accepted
that human rights law can “support, reinforce or supplement refugee law.”171 Although it
may appear obvious, the right to freedom of movement, which is a basic human right, is
linked to successful actions taken towards durable solutions. This is why it is beneficial
for host states to ensure that refugees are afforded this protection. The State is exhibiting
responsibility from the start by establishing camps, so it must further that responsibility to
include enforcement and assurance of basic human rights.
In Canada v. Ward, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that the protection of
those at risk of human rights violations is “the lens through which refugee law must be
focused.” The decision in June of 1993 in the appeal of Patrick Francis Ward “broadens
the scope of the definition to include those genuinely lacking protection from imminent
harm while cutting shy of those who have other viable options than to seek refugee
status.” The Ward decision makes lack of protection by the state the central element of
refugee definition.172 Yet, there is a tension between what is seen as the right to respect
and dignity as a human being, regardless of where they are, and what is often seen as the
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right of all sovereign nationals and states to safeguard their own interests.173 States
complain that there is an „erosion‟ of sovereign freedom as the there is a continuous
deference to human rights and migration law. The conditions and circumstances under
which it is considered possible to shift displaced persons‟ rights claims are not found only
in the lack of political will by states to respect and protect refugee rights. Neither are
they found in poor interpretations of the law. Instead, they are rooted in the “discursive
limits”174 within which the modern human rights regime now functions. The discursive
limits are attributed to the gap between human rights law and refugee law.
Counter-arguments have insisted that the human rights regime is not divided and
the human right to freedom is founded within the authority of sovereign states.
Internationally-speaking, there are no laws of rights of the displaced unless there is
codification from the „emplaced‟ states‟ citizens. This way, the rights of displaced
persons may be different but they are still under the heading of human rights law created
by sovereign states.175 Under the heading of refugee law, states who are signatories to
the conventions are not obligated to admit anyone onto their territory.

A state is

responsible to provide asylum to those who make refugee claims on the state‟s own
territory. This further enforces the idea that those who are displaced are subject solely to
state governances and jurisdiction
1. Refugee Law and its Origins in Human Rights Law
The refugee protection regime has its origins “in general principles in human
rights.”176 By looking at the UDHR‟s Article 14 and its right to seek and enjoy asylum
from persecution177 along with “unanimously agreed human rights and fundamental
freedoms” one can see that this “squarely places [international refugee law] within the
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human rights paradigm.”178 After all, the Senior Legal Coordinator for the Division of
International Protection at the UNHCR in Geneva Alice Edwards reminds the
international community that even though refugees are not specifically mentioned in the
UN Charter, it was not an oversight considering the post-World War II environment and
massive refugee flows helped initiate the creation of the United Nations.179 The inclusion
of this particular article in the UDHR reinforces this.
Furthermore, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner‟s Programme
(ExCom) reiterated the obligation to “treat asylum-seekers and refugees in accordance
with applicable human rights and refugee law standards as set out in relevant
international instruments.”180

In their allegiance to the 1951 Convention and 1967

Protocol, Contracting States “[r]eaffirmed [their] continued commitment, in recognition
of the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, to upholding the values
and principles embodied in these instruments, which are consistent with Article 14 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and which require respect for the rights and
freedoms of refugees.”181 This pledge was in 2002 – ten years into Somalia‟s civil war
and Kenya‟s policies of containment towards the refugees.
The 1951 Convention‟s preamble states its decent from the UN Charter as well as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.182 The 1951 Convention and other refugee
law instruments codify rights which states are responsible for providing to refugees. The
1951 Convention is “very much a living document which, despite its vintage, maintains
its relevance in respect of providing a normative framework to address contemporary
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refugee problems.”183 Despite the scope of human rights which is applicable to everyone,
national or not, the provisions are often ignored or manipulated by the receiving host
state.

Refugee law provides human rights standards for refugees, and within the

framework of human rights, one of the very important standards is the right to freedom of
movement.
Since its inception, refugee law has been a “means of reconciling the commitment
of states to discretionary control over immigration to the reality of coerced international
movements of persons between states.”184 In other words, refugee law can provide
assistance to states who are forced to distinguish between those moving across its
borders. There are some movements that states cannot avoid, and these movements can
come in massive numbers. By establishing a regime which claims to objectively define
those with a preferred right to admission, refugee law legitimizes the protectionist
norm.185 In many respects, refugee law crosses the threshold enforceability past which
international human rights law has found it difficult to continue. Refugee law provides
an enforceable remedy – available under specified circumstances – for an individual
facing human rights abuses.186 The refugee law regime is “generating a serious body of
law that elaborates basic human rights norms and has important implications in – and
beyond – the refugee context.”187
2. Protection and the UNHCR
The uniqueness of the international refugee protection system lies in its roots – a
legally binding and standard setting treaty – which itself borrowed heavily from universal
human rights principles and customary international law. International refugee protection
has evolved and developed not only through the experiences, practices and
implementations of its language by principal actors such as State signatories and the
UNHCR. Refugee law has also developed through the contribution of a variety of
183
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international instruments, the work of intergovernmental bodies, including regional
organizations, and jurists188 who parallel their work with human rights law. Refugee law
and human rights law must work together to fill in the gaps of implementation. A state
cannot delegate human rights duties, so the UNHCR is present within state territory.
However, proof that the refugee system is collapsing, and the lack of enforcement of
human rights protection comes from the UNHCR delegating state responsibilities.
The UNHCR is a rights-based organization.

To the UNHCR, refugees are

“victims of human rights abuses, or human rights deficits, and they lack a national
government willing or able to redress their situation. Protection, at its most basic, means
activities to restore rights…[p]rotection is also about the creation of an enabling
environment so that these, and other rights, have a real chance of being enjoyed until a
durable solution is found.” Protection of human rights is first a state responsibility, but
often the UNHCR is called upon to be the “deliverer of protection.”189 Because of this
calling, the UNHCR has “crossed the line”190 that was once the division of human rights
law and refugee law. It has already done this with the establishment within the United
Nations that works with refugees. As the UNHCR continues to exercise its capacity as a
human rights monitoring and intervening agency, while trying to balance the role of
providing humanitarian assistance, it must also seek to remain attentive to the human
rights of refugees in the host country.191 The solutions for refugees are dependent upon
the restoration and protection of their rights – foremost the right to freedom of
movement.
The promotion of human rights principles as part of its protection policies is
described in the UNHCR‟s policy paper. This policy paper is the first time UNHCR has
addressed the “interrelationship of human rights and refugee protection in a
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comprehensive manner.”192 The UNHCR states that human rights bodies (in particular,
treat implementation bodies), have become “increasingly aware of the relevance of
refugee protection problems to their mandates and have been actively seeking a UNHCR
input into their deliberations.193 The policy paper also stresses the founding principle of
the UN Charter relating to collective and individual responsibility for human rights 194 as
well as mentioning the UNHCR‟s first address to the UN Commission on Human Rights
in which the linkage between human rights concerns and refugee issues was expressed.
The linkage was described as the following:
Violations of human rights are a major cause of refugee exodus and in its efforts
to curb such violations this Commission also contributes to the prevention of
refugee flows.

Violations of human rights also create complex problems of

protection in countries of asylum […] Finally, too, restoration of acceptable
human rights situations in countries of origin can be the key to successful
resolution of long-standing refugee problems.

It is clear that human rights

considerations are central across the spectrum of the refugee problem, from
departure through refuge to the realisation of a lasting solution.195
The policy statement is important in that it provides the UNHCR with a general guideline
of how to incorporate human rights “standards, information and mechanisms” in its
protection activities.196
A fundamental strongpoint is the day-to-day presence of UNHCR protection
officers in field situations. This allows UNHCR officials to develop an appreciation of
the country conditions and potential solutions to refugee protection problems as well as a
likelihood of different approaches having a favorable outcome.
192
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presence is important for assessing as well as monitoring the extent of human rights
issues in a particular region since the host state has basically passed its protection
responsibility onto the UNHCR. This has an impact on protecting or producing refugees.
Assessments may develop into a strategy to take remedial action through intervening and
working with government authorities, legal or national human rights institutions as well
as NGOs. This way, assistance programs and protection initiatives towards protecting
and ensuring human rights for refugees can be developed and implemented.197
Although UN mechanisms may not provide a framework of protection as
expansive, reliable and accessible as some domestic systems, international human rights
law has contributed to this international legal system which can be invoked in support of
both specific cases and more broad – based advocacy on behalf of refugees.

The

UNHCR can use the laws and mechanisms to enhance protection principles and give
effect to forms of enforcement. The recent developments in human rights law, including
the UN Commission and Sub-Commission on Human Rights as well as the Human
Rights Committee, can assist in refugee protection. 198
Besides the variety of the scope and application in the international treaties,
difficulty is in the enforcement of rights. Ensuring that refugees are afforded their human
rights while still being kept in parallel with refugee law instruments is the difficulty
involved with the gap. Under human rights, there is an established system of treaty
bodies playing a supervisory role that ensures states are complying with their
obligations.199 There is also the limitation of state agreement with the actions the UN can
take, as well as the provisions of the human rights treaty under which the state is a
signatory, which can hinder human rights law from enforcing refugee rights.

The

UNHCR has the “necessary personality” within international law to engage with the
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human rights law that applies to refugees,”200 making it one example of how to render
human rights of refugees possible.

E. Lack of Freedom of Movement: The Sovereignty Challenge
1. Right to Leave and Return
The element of refugee choice is being compromised both with respect to the
right to leave and the right to return. Thus, the only right being upheld is the right to
remain. This is “suspect,”201 according to Bill Frelick, the director of Human Rights
Watch‟s refugee program. It is also challenging because the right to remain is also being
enforced by the state restricting refugees‟ freedom of movement. Since even durable
solutions involve movement, any restriction on freedom of movement is also against a
state‟s interest to relieve itself of its refugee “problem.” Therefore, it is in both the state‟s
interest as well as the refugee‟s interest for there to be an assurance of the right to
freedom of movement. The state‟s ambivalence is hindering itself from addressing its
refugee issues in political and economic terms as well as humanitarian.
The traditional state-centered international regime of human rights is continually
battling against the right to freedom of movement. Critics of the discord between rights
of displaced persons and rights of nationals believe that the rights of the displaced fall
within a category aside from international human rights law. The rights of the displaced
actually support the autonomy of sovereign peoples. They argue that the international
obligations created for states regarding any displaced persons are not exactly human
rights law.

They are not universally-recognized, and therefore they are their own

category of rights stemming from “narrow treaties made by states for the purposes of
securing the international social order within a state-based discipline of human rights.”202
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2. State Protection
Satvinder Juss argues that the legal right of a State to exclude people is often
asserted as an expression of its sovereignty. Sovereignty, he affirms, implies absolute
power. However, state power cannot be described in terms of sovereignty because
sovereignty is not a state of affairs nor is it a fact; it is “simply a doctrine.”203 Since one
of the core functions of a state is to protect its citizens, it can be assumed that a state,
while exercising its sovereignty, regulates migration in and out of its jurisdiction.
General Comment (GC) No. 31 of the ICCPR on the “Nature of the General Legal
Obligation” states that, “Moreover, the article 2 obligation requiring that States parties
respect and ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons
under their control entails an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise
remove a person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing
that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7
of the Covenant, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country
to which the person may subsequently be removed.”204

International law provides

occasions in which States may restrict freedom of movement. These circumstances are
very limited. Both the ICCPR and the Rights of the Child prohibit states from restricting
the right to leave any country except when it is to “protect national security, public order,
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.”205 The restrictions must
also be consistent with the other rights recognized in those same treaties.

F. Human Rights of Refugees: It Gets Complicated
Submitting to international pressure and hoping to repair previous losses and rifts
with outside financiers, Kenya had suspended its threat to forcibly remove its refugees. It
„grudgingly‟206 allowed them to settle within Kenyan territory. It allowed them on
Kenyan soil with conditions. The refugees could only stay if they resided in camps in the
northern parts of Kenya. This would be to abate feelings of insecurity and threats to the
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tourism industry. Therefore, Kenya pressured the UNHCR to repatriate all refugees to
camps near the Kenyan border with Somalia,207 away from interaction with locals in
major cities and urban areas.
While governments may proclaim a willingness or duty to assist refugees from
countries who have suffered havoc and massive human rights violations, there also
appears to be a “pattern of defensive strategies”208 that assist host countries in avoiding
the international legal obligation found in refugee law. For refugees themselves, perhaps
what has been described as increasingly marginal relevance to refugee law does lead to
the belief that there is an overall lack of protection.209 If there is protection, it is because
of a state‟s realist-centric vision that actions such as warehousing could in the long-term
assist a state in protecting its citizens without having to give up any jurisdiction, and a
state could still argue that it is upholding its legal obligations under international refugee
law.
The goal of refugee law is not enforceability, at least in the strict sense.210 Instead
it is described as a mechanism by which state governments agree to compromise their
sovereignty to independent action in order to manage complex refugee issues, contain
conflict, and avoid catastrophe.

It also attempts to promote decency.211

Juggling

between these aspects while maintaining sovereignty, Kenya has acted on its
responsibility to refugees by establishing the camps.

However, it must further

demonstrate its responsibility by ensuring freedom of movement for its refugees.
Camps and settlements in host states perpetuate refugee status rather than end it
by preventing incorporation into society. Kenya has done this with warehousing in the
Dadaab camps and incorporating a useless movement pass system. By placing the camps
so far from society and close to the Somali border, Kenya has been successful at keeping
refugees segregated so they maintain their old relationship with one another and keep
their national identity. This segregation allows Kenya to prevent the refugees from
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competing with locals for many necessities including employment, land, housing, water,
pasture, firewood, transportation services, and any income-generating activities.212
Similar to surrounding countries such as Sudan, those who live outside of the Dadaab
camps and travel to and from the camps face serious risk of being arrested, detained and
deported.213 As long as the refugees are kept in distinct groups in the camps with little
movement opportunities, they are no longer seen as a threat (or arguably, a burden). If
the refugees are allowed to travel to Nairobi or any other city outside of the camps, they
could easily “melt”214 into local communities and become indistinguishable which would
cause a problem for Kenya. It would cause a problem for any country which depends
upon international donor funds. Therefore, the placing of refugees in segregated camps is
seen as necessary for shifting responsibility from the host country to the international
community.215 In this case, it is easier for Kenya to hand responsibility over to the
UNHCR because the refugees are there in the camps. There is no hiding them, and they
are there for the international community to have responsibility over, not among local
Kenyans for the Kenyan government to try to distinguish apart. Kenya may think it is
doing its fellow UN assistants a favor by keeping refugees segregated, but by limiting
their freedom of movement Kenta is still violating both its responsibility to international
refugee law and human rights law.
Forcing refugees to remain within a camp is a violation of their freedom of
movement unless the governing authorities can show any of the following: that this
forcing is based on clear and precise law; that it is being done only to meet a legitimate
aim for the country and is the least restrictive means to achieve the specific aim, 216 and
finally, while balancing the impact with the desired legitimate aim, it must be
proportionate and non-discriminatory.217
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While the Somali refugees are not “warmly welcomed” in Kenya, the Kenyan
government has been obliged to accept them because of its commitment to international
law. Mostly, however, Kenya accepts them because it needs the continued support of
donor countries.218 With its neighbor Somalia caught in an ongoing civil war, Kenya
does have legitimate security concerns and a right to control what happens within its
borders. However, the conflict in Somalia continues to feed the refugee problem within
Kenya‟s borders and as long as Somalia is unstable, Kenya will experience the
repercussions. Kenya did close its borders in 2007, but 4,000 Somalis a month are still
crossing the border.219 Kenya‟s relations to its refugees and its signs of ambivalence
create different opinions as to whether Kenya is trying to rid itself of its refugee
„problem‟ or if it is acting accordingly to its obligations under international law. Kenya‟s
tolerance of the refugees is most likely due to the UNHCR accepting full practical
responsibility.220

G. Justifications for Restrictions of Movement
Kenya‟s Refugee Act of 2006 offers every refugee the entitlement to every right
which Kenya has an international obligation.221 However, the Kenyan refugee law also
allows for authorities to establish camps, confine refugees to those camps, and on
exception allow certain refugees to travel outside the camps if they have a valid pass.222
Kenya‟s constitution states that a person‟s freedom of movement may be restricted if it is
“reasonably required in the interests of defense, public safety, or public order.” 223 The
interests may only be invoked if they meet the following criteria:
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Non-discrimination
A restriction on movement must not have a discriminatory effect. 224 Differential
treatment between non-citizens and citizens based on their citizenship must also be
strictly justified.225
Provided for by national law
Any restriction on freedom of movement must be distinctly set out in domestic
law. This is to prevent any state official from making arbitrary and abusive decisions. It
is also to ensure that those who have their right to free movement restricted understand
their rights.
For a legitimate aim
A restriction on freedom of movement must be justified by the following aims
which are found within the ICCPR: national security, public order and health, or the
rights and freedoms of others. Kenya must be specific regarding how any of these aims
require a restriction on movement. The measure taken must be proportionate to the
pursued aim.
Necessary
Of course a restriction on freedom of movement must be considered necessary
and the restrictions “must be provided by law, must be necessary in a democratic society
for the protection of these purposes and must be consistent with all other rights
recognized in the Covenant.”226
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Proportionate
In regards to proportionality, the least restrictive measures possible on freedom of
movement must be taken to meet the aim. The state must balance three factors to
determine which is least restrictive: first, the extent of the restriction; second, the impact
on peoples‟ exercise of the right affected; and finally, the state must consider why the
restriction is necessary to bring about the desired aim.227
Kenya is obligated under international law to balance all of these factors. One
example is forcing a group to stay within the camp boundaries. This is a violation of
their freedom of movement. States must be show that based on the above criteria,
restricting movement meets a legitimate aim and the least restrictive measures are being
taken. The impact must also be proportionate and non-discriminatory.
Restricting only refugees‟ freedom of movement is discriminatory regardless of
whether they have obtained a movement pass. The movement pass system does not meet
the criteria because it is very subjective. It is ineffective because there is no one to
monitor the police at checkpoints who decide whether a refugee is allowed through.
Kenya has created an image that it seeks to help its large number of refugees on its soil,
especially with its Refugee Act of 2006 but this conveniently does nothing for setting out
the precise criteria on which the police may justify restricting refugees‟ freedom of
movement. According to Human Rights Watch, Kenyan authorities have not been able to
say why they have restricted the movement of nearly 300,000 refugees in Dadaab and
why this would be necessary to achieve any aims. In fact, there has been no stated
aim.228

H. Responsibility-Sharing Rather Than Burden-Sharing
The artificiality that has been created, between human rights and refugee law, has
caused states to look to the UNHCR to deal with its burden-sharing. In fact, it is seen
more as burden-sharing than responsibility-sharing and the UNHCR should not be
expected to take on all of the states‟ roles in protecting refugees‟ rights. Providing
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effective protection to refugees has become more difficult as conflicts continue to ensue
and push groups of people out, where warring factions lack legitimacy or proper
authority, and where there is a lack of accountability in regards to compliance with
human rights (or even humanitarian) behavior.229 The UNHCR cannot be expected to
solve a state‟s refugee problem, and there needs to be “some rationalization of
responsibilities”230 in order to introduce more effective and thus better outcomes of
protection. Changing the mindset from burden-sharing to responsibility-sharing arises
recognizing that refugees are not only a problem but also part of the solution. It also
stems from recognizing that host countries are often the least equipped financially and
logistically to assist refugees in situations of mass influx. Therefore, the UNHCR is often
dependent on states offering asylum to share the task231 and this hinders refugee
protection as a whole.
The roles that the UNHCR holds, and its complicity in human rights violations
such as warehousing, demonstrate the gap that exists in refugee protection between
traditional international legal norms and the reality of the practical implementation.
UNHCR has acquired de facto sovereignty while assisting Kenya in following through
with its international obligations. Even though the UNHCR is exercising this type of
sovereignty, de jure it is only an invited guest.232 This further proves that the system is
under a considerable amount of pressure and that international human rights law is not
applicable to a relationship between refugees and the UNHCR.233 Rather, human rights
law is applicable to the relationship between refugees and the state.
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IV. Conclusion
There is a crisis within the scope of protection for refugees. What would be the
applicable law regime is no longer meeting the interests and needs of whom it applies. 234
The local efforts of the UNHCR as well as the domestic legislation that is seen in Kenya
are attempts of affording refugees their rights under the international law regime.
Unfortunately, however, there is nothing in the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol
that prepares these actors and instruments for situations of mass influx. The host state
has the “primary responsibility for ensuring security in refugee camps and refugeepopulated areas.”235 By delegating responsibility to the UNHCR it is delegitimizing its
role as a sovereign state and proving that the 1951 Convention is outdated. Kenya‟s
ambivalence to both its refugees in the camps and in the cities exemplifies the challenge
of arguing that refugees‟ right to freedom of movement must be sought through a human
rights lens.

Without the support of the international community and human rights,

countries that are legally responsible for protecting refugees would not have any means
of meeting their responsibility.
For Human Security Now, the Commission on Human Security, it is not just
about refugees who are moving. There are many groups of people moving. The issue is
not the legal distinction between the groups on the move but rather that there are actually
people moving within and across country borders to improve their livelihood, escape
poverty, seek new opportunities, rejoin family members, or because of war, violent
conflict, human rights abuses, expulsion or discrimination.236 The movement of people
must be looked at from all dimensions, being sure to take into account the political, civil,
security, economic and social reasons people move. Human Security Now recognizes
that today‟s policies, norms, and institutions are not taking into account all that they
should, and consequently there are major gaps left to fill regarding movement.
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The current “legal muddle”237 that delegates state responsibility to the UNHCR
intensifies the “cleavage”238 that exists in refugee protection. Although the UNHCR is
exercising de facto sovereignty, it is only de jure an invited guest. It is assisting in the
host country‟s obligations and from this standpoint onward, international human rights
law can only be applicable to refugees and the host state rather than refugees and the
UNHCR.239 This confusion perpetuates the problematic gap that exists between human
rights law and refugee law.

It is necessary to consider human rights law in the

deficiencies of refugee law; otherwise there will continue to be a crisis.
The refugee population is continuing to become more protracted. The average
length of major refugee situations has increased from nine years to twenty, from 1993
until present day.240

The reality of perpetual protracted situations exploits the gap

between human rights and refugee law, and it puts failure on the international community
to protect the refugees which, in essence, it has created. The UNHCR faces the challenge
of upholding its norms and responsibilities while working within a state sovereign system
that deals with massive numbers of refugees. To fulfill its mandate of protection, the
UNHCR must play a more “facilitative and catalytic role”241 in order to encourage states
to fulfill their international responsibilities.
Human rights are required because refugee law is not sufficient to meet the
movement needs of refugees. Freedom of movement is a part of the human rights
vernacular, and there is little forward discussion on the human rights of refugees as such.
There is a serious protracted condition in Kenya that proves there is a weakness, or a
crisis, in the refugee law regime. This is crucial time for human rights law to enter the
discourse.
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